"Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games : A Comment on Dubey-Shubik (1978)
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (1988), for which the trivial Nash Equilibrium is the unique equilibrium point of the associated market game. From this example, we are led to propose an argument, related to the intensity of competition, explaining why there could be no trade at an equilibrium point.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 1994|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.