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The Penalty for Tax Evasion when Taxes are set Optimally

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  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

    (Université de Liège, Université de Paris I and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • POSSEN, Uri

    (Cornell University)

  • SLUTSKY, Steven

    (University of Florida)

Abstract

This paper considers why limited penalties are used to punish tax evaders. The basic model has all individuals drawing an income from the same random distribution. The individuals must decide whether to report thruthfully or understate their incomes. Two types of individuals exist who differ in either their degree of risk aversion or their initial wealth endowment. The government chooses tax rates, audit probabilities, and penalties for evasion to maximize an expected ex post social welfare function. Penalties are at their upper bound if individuals feel unlimited harm from such penalties or if the optimum has everyone reporting thruthfully. However, when the maximum penalty inflicts limited harm, it can be optimal to have some individuals falsely report and have the penalty less than its upper bound.

Suggested Citation

  • PESTIEAU, Pierre & POSSEN, Uri & SLUTSKY, Steven, 1994. "The Penalty for Tax Evasion when Taxes are set Optimally," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994016
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1994.html
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    Cited by:

    1. Sato, Hideki, 2015. "Favoritism toward the Poor and a Discontinuous Tax Structure," MPRA Paper 66945, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2015.

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