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Three results on communication, information and common knowledge

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  • WEYERS , Sonia

Abstract

I extend the results on communication, information and common knowledge by proving the following : 1. If n individuals with partitional information structures communicate their posterior probabilities of an event sequentially, one to one at a time, according to a scheme whim never excludes anyone permanently, and they revise in a nonmyopic way, then they eventually reach common knowledge. 2. If n individuals with partitional information structures form posterior probabilities of a given event and the minimum of their posteriors is common knowledge as well as the number of times it is attained then all posteriors must be equal. 3. Balancedness, the property of non-partitional information structures necessary and sufficient to prevent "Agreeing to Disagree", is in fact a very unrestrictive requirement. A new property, subnestedness, implies balancedness.

Suggested Citation

  • WEYERS , Sonia, 1992. "Three results on communication, information and common knowledge," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1992028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1992028
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp1992.html
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    Cited by:

    1. Koessler, Frederic, 2001. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 139-159, September.
    2. Crescenzi, Michele, 2022. "Learning to agree over large state spaces," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    3. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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