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A case for differential inheritance taxation


  • CREMER, H.


This paper incorporates the case of a variable number of children in a simple model of the distribution of inherited wealth. In particular, the possibility of childless couples, and hence of bequests from relatives other than parents (i.e., "collateral bequests") is considered. Within such a setting, two questions are raised. First, do collateral bequests increase the distributional inequality of wealth? Second, should one adopt inheritance tax rates that depend on the inheritor's blood relationship to the donor? In other words, does there exist an economic justification for differential inheritance taxation such as it is usual in many countries (e.g. France and Germany).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cremer, H. & Pestieau, P., 1986. "A case for differential inheritance taxation," CORE Discussion Papers 1986033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1986033

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Gretlein, Rodney & Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 1996. "To fight or not to fight? That is the question," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 85-114, April.
    5. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
    8. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    9. Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43.
    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:04:p:943-957_23 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Louis Kaplow, 2000. "A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation," NBER Working Papers 7775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2011. "The Tax Treatment of Intergenerational Wealth Transfers ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 365-401, June.
    3. Helmuth Cremer & ) & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Survey," Public Economics 0311003, EconWPA.

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