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Frames of governance: Comparing institutional arrangements over the policy space

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Bogliacino
  • Cristiano Codagnone
  • Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri

Abstract

In this article, we develop a framework to analyze the relationship between evidence and policy. Postulating a normative criterion based on cost-benefit analysis and the value of a piece of information, as well as a topology of the policy space defined by three characteristics (epistemic uncertainty, interests, and the degree of value conflicts), we identify the (Nash) equilibria of an interaction between experts and citizens in providing information to a decision maker. In this setup, we study three institutional arrangements (evidence-based policy, deliberative governance, and negotiated conflict) that differ in terms of reliance on experts and citizens for providing information. We show that different degrees of uncertainty, interests, and values-relevance surrounding issue at stake result in vastly different arrangement performances; hence, to foster efficiency, rules should be contingent.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Bogliacino & Cristiano Codagnone & Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri, 2018. "Frames of governance: Comparing institutional arrangements over the policy space," Econógrafos, Escuela de Economía 022856, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000176:022856
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    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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