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Mercados interbancarios no colateralizados e informaci�n asim�trica: un mecanismo para lograr la participaci�n plena de los bancos deficitarios cuando

Author

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  • Camilo Gonz�lez

Abstract

En este trabajo se proponen dos tipos de contratos para los pr�stamos interbancarios con el fin de que los bancos suavicen sus choques de liquidez a trav�s del mercado interbancario. En particular, se estudia la situaci�n en la que los bancos con faltantes de liquidez que tienen bajo riesgo de cr�dito abandonan el mercado debido a que la tasa de inter�s es alta en relaci�n a su fuente alterna de financiamiento. La asimetr�a en la informaci�n acerca del riesgo de cr�dito impide que los bancos con excedentes de liquidez ajusten la tasa de inter�s considerando el riesgo de su contraparte. Dado lo anterior, se dise�an dos contratos para los cr�ditos interbancarios que se diferencian en las tasas de inter�s cobradas. As�, siempre que un banco constituya un dep�sito podr� obtener liquidez a bajas tasas de inter�s; en la situaci�n contraria la tasa ser� m�s elevada.

Suggested Citation

  • Camilo Gonz�lez, 2013. "Mercados interbancarios no colateralizados e informaci�n asim�trica: un mecanismo para lograr la participaci�n plena de los bancos deficitarios cuando," Borradores de Economia 10466, Banco de la Republica.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000094:010466
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mercado interbancario no colateralizado; informaci�n asim�trica; riesgo de cr�dito; choques de liqui;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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