Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model
This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capitalinvestment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders´inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthyposition of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome,i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis.This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction betweenthe economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy ex-planations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle,providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some Latin-American countries in the late seventies and early nineties.
|Date of creation:||28 Feb 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000092:006885. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Facultad de Economía)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.