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Income, Wealth, and Conflicts of Interest of Legislators in Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Oskar Nupia

    (Universidad de los Andes)

  • Andrés Álvarez

    (Universidad de los Andes)

Abstract

Gaps between the socioeconomic characteristics of politicians and those of their constituents have been shown to affect public policy, yet little is known about Colombian legislators. Using mandatory disclosure filings, we document their income, wealth, and conflicts of interest (CI) in the 2018–2022 and 2022–2026 Congresses. The median legislator earns seven to eight times the income of the median tax filer and holds five to six times the wealth. Because their income is mostly salary, they pay effective tax rates two to three times those of filers with the same gross income. Information on legislators from before and after they take office suggests that entering Congress shifts them from the 88th to the 97th percentile in income among tax filers. About 70% of legislators report CI, in all economic sectors. Left-wing legislators report lower gross income and wealth but, conditional on wealth, are not less likely to report CI. By sector, CI are more likely in Agriculture and Livestock for right-wing legislators and in Information and Communication and Administrative Services for left-wing legislators. Wealthier legislators report more CI in more sectors, and each additional term in Congress is associated with about 15% more wealth. These patterns suggest a representational distance that extends, beyond income, to the nature of legislators’ economic ties.

Suggested Citation

  • Oskar Nupia & Andrés Álvarez, 2026. "Income, Wealth, and Conflicts of Interest of Legislators in Colombia," Documentos CEDE 2026-61, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:023915
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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