IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Code-sharing and its effect on airline fares and welfare


  • Achim I. Czerny

    () (Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP), Technische Universität Berlin)


Airlines frequently use code-share agreements allowing them to market seats on flights operated by partner airlines. Current studies argue that with complementary networks this generates positive welfare effects because fares for interline passengers who rely on the service of multiple airlines are supposed to fall. However, with codeshare agreements airlines can price discriminate between interline and other passengers. This might harm the latter which has been ignored so far. We show that code-share agreements can lead to welfare losses in the case of complementary networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Achim I. Czerny, 2006. "Code-sharing and its effect on airline fares and welfare," Working Papers 2006-15, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI).
  • Handle: RePEc:cni:wpaper:2006-15

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, 2000. "Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 25-51, March.
    2. Doganoglu, Toker & Wright, Julian, 2006. "Multihoming and compatibility," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 45-67, January.
    3. Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1996. "Horizontal and vertical differentiation: The Launhardt model," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 485-506, June.
    4. Faulhaber, Gerald R & Hogendorn, Christiaan, 2000. "The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 305-329, September.
    5. Avner Shaked & John Sutton, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13.
    6. Gehrig, Thomas, 1998. "Competing markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 277-310, February.
    7. Shane Greenstein, 2006. "Innovation and the Evolution of Market Structure for Internet Access in the United States," Discussion Papers 05-018, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    8. repec:reg:rpubli:65 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hahn Robert W. & Wallsten Scott, 2006. "The Economics of Net Neutrality," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 3(6), pages 1-7, June.
    10. Rubinfeld, Daniel L & Singer, Hal J, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Broadband Access?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 299-318, September.
    11. Church, Jeffrey & Gandal, Neil, 1992. "Network Effects, Software Provision, and Standardization," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 85-103, March.
    12. Scott Savage & Michael Wirth, 2005. "Price, Programming and Potential Competition in US Cable Television Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 25-46, September.
    13. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-414, May.
    14. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Multiproduct Firms, Product Differentiation, and Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Airlines; alliances; code-share agreements; antitrust immunity; price discrimination;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cni:wpaper:2006-15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabian Kirsch). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.