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The Relevance of the Strong Law of Large Numbers for Estimation of a commodity Price Distribution and Its Means


  • Eugenio Bobenrieth

    () (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción)

  • Juan Bobenrieth
  • Brian D. Wright


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Eugenio Bobenrieth & Juan Bobenrieth & Brian D. Wright, 2002. "The Relevance of the Strong Law of Large Numbers for Estimation of a commodity Price Distribution and Its Means," Working Papers 03-2002, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
  • Handle: RePEc:cnc:wpaper:03-2002

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    1. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2007. "Candidate quality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 7-27, February.
    2. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    3. Philip Jones & John Hudson, 1998. "The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 175-189, January.
    4. Caillaud, B. & Tirole, J., 1999. "Party governance and ideological bias," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 779-789, April.
    5. Claudio Parés, 2009. "Is it reasonable to allocate power to appointed regional authorities?," Working Papers 04-2009, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
    6. Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008. "Party cues and yardstick voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 470-477, June.
    7. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1992. "The role of party reputation in the formation of policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 107-121, October.
    8. Steven Tadelis, 2002. "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 854-882, August.
    9. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties as Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489.
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