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Redes sociales, confianza y hábitos financieros: un análisis empírico

Author

Listed:
  • Sonia Di Giannatale

    () (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)

  • Alexander Elbittar

    () (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)

  • Lucy Maya

    () (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)

  • Alfredo Ramírez

    () (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas)

  • María José Roa

    () (Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos)

Abstract

Con el objetivo de estudiar la asociación entre las características y los recursos de una red social y los hábitos financieros de sus miembros, aplicamos una encuesta en una comunidad académica acotada en la Ciudad de México. En consonancia con la literatura de redes y desarrollo financiero, nuestros resultados predicen que el uso y acceso a instrumentos financieros formales podrían estar relacionados con una estructura abierta y heterogénea de las redes sociales a las cuales los individuos recurren frente a sus necesidades financieras y emergencias personales. Nuestros resultados muestran que el uso de instrumentos financieros formales parece estar parcialmente explicado por la diversidad de red de los individuos. En particular, obtenemos que a mayor diversidad de red, mayor uso de instrumentos financieros formales. Sin embargo, el coeficiente de la diversidad de red no resulta ser estadísticamente significativo para explicar el uso de instrumentos financieros informales.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonia Di Giannatale & Alexander Elbittar & Lucy Maya & Alfredo Ramírez & María José Roa, 2012. "Redes sociales, confianza y hábitos financieros: un análisis empírico," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers 3, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cml:docinv:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social networks; development; financial markets; redes sociales; desarrollo; mercados financieros.;

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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