Finite perfect information extensive games with generic payoffs
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Keywordsperfect information games; extensive games; backward induction; Weakly dominated strategies; iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies; generic payoffs;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-11 (Game Theory)
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