The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
We examine the relevance of an auction format in a competitive environment by analyzing and comparing uniform and discriminatory price auctions with many bidders. We show that if the number of objects for sale is small relative to the number of bidders, then all equilibria of both auctions are approximately efficient and lead to approximately the same revenue. When the number of objects for sale is proportional to the number of bidders, then the particulars of the auction format matter. All equilibria of the uniform auction are efficient while all of the equilibria of the discriminatory auction are inefficient. The relative revenue rankings of the auction formats can go in either direction, depending on the specifics of the environment.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2004|
|Publication status:||Published: Published in Review of Economic Studies, V. 73, #4, 2006, ppg. 941-960|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125|
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125|
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