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Is the Status Quo Relevant in a Representative Democracy?

Listed author(s):
  • Jon X. Eguia
Registered author(s):

    This work studies the effect of the value of the status quo in the candidates' decisions and policy outcomes in a representative democracy with endogenous candidates. Following the citizen-candidate model due to Besley and Coate (1997) we show, for a unidimensional policy issue and for both an odd and even number of citizens, that some equilibria only hold for certain values of the status quo policy. In particular we find that a moderate status quo rules out equilibrium outcomes in which there is an uncontested candidate and that two-candidate equilibria exist more generally when the number of citizens is even.

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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1176a.pdf
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    Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1176.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2003
    Publication status: Published:
    Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1176
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    Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125

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    Web page: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/ss
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    Order Information: Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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