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Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach

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  • Camerer, Colin
  • Ho, Teck-Hua

Abstract

We describe a general model, 'experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning, which includes reinforcement learning and a class of weighted fictitious play belief models as special cases. In EWA, strategies have attractions which reflect prior predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine choice probabilities according to some rule (e.g., logit). A key feature is a parameter δ which weights the strength of hypothetical reinforcement of strategies which were not chosen according to the payoff they would have yielded. When δ = 0 choice reinforcement results. When δ = 1, levels of reinforcement of strategies are proportional to expected payoffs given beliefs based on past history. Another key feature is the growth rates of attractions. The EWA model controls the growth rates by two decay parameters, φ and ρ, which depreciate attractions and amount of experience separately. When φ = ρ belief-based models result; when ρ = 0 choice reinforcement results. Using three data sets, parameter estimates of the model were calibrated on part of the data and used to predict the rest. Estimates of δ are generally around .50, φ around 1, and ρ varies from 0 to φ. Choice reinforcement models often outperform belief-based models in the calibration phase and underperform in out-of-sample validation. Both special cases are generally rejected in favor of EWA, though sometimes belief models do better. EWA is able to combine the best features of both approaches, allowing attractions to begin and grow exibly as choice reinforcement does, but reinforcing unchosen strategies substantially as belief-based models implicitly do.

Suggested Citation

  • Camerer, Colin & Ho, Teck-Hua, 1997. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: A Unifying Approach," Working Papers 1003, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1003
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1003.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. James M. Poterba & Steven F. Venti, 1998. "Personal Retirement Saving Programs and Asset Accumulation: Reconciling the Evidence," NBER Chapters,in: Frontiers in the Economics of Aging, pages 23-124 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
    3. Gary Charness & Dan Levin, 2005. "When Optimal Choices Feel Wrong: A Laboratory Study of Bayesian Updating, Complexity, and Affect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1300-1309, September.
    4. A. Shorrocks & T. Hens & H. Gottinger & S. Reichelstein & B. Kuon & M. Frenkel & R. Braun & R. Noll & Y. Xu, 1997. "Book Reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 308-328, October.
    5. Bigoni, Maria & Fort, Margherita, 2013. "Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 192-214.
    6. Richard, Jean-François, 2000. "Conférence François-Albert Angers (1999). Enchères : théorie économique et réalité," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(2), pages 173-198, juin.
    7. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.

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