Noise, Information and the Favorite-Longshot Bias
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2006. "Noise, Information, and the Favorite-Longshot Bias," FRU Working Papers 2006/04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Finance Research Unit.
References listed on IDEAS
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions," Working Papers 2004.148, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000397. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: http://www.najecon.org/ .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .