Author
Listed:
- Vincent Boucher
- Josette Gbeto
- Maripier Isabelle
Abstract
When prices are fixed, queues become central allocation mechanisms. Yet decentralized waiting queues are often unobserved, creating inefficiencies and the opportunity for informal access through referral networks. This paper studies a 2016 reform in Quebec, Canada, that introduced a centralized system for allocating medical referrals from general practitioners to physician specialists. We find that centralization significantly reduced new specialist consultations. We also infer physician referral networks and estimate a structural model that enables us to conclude that specialists tend to defer consultations for patients referred by general practitioners from whom they receive an unusually large number of referrals. Lorsque les prix sont fixes, les files d’attente deviennent des mécanismes centraux d’allocation des ressources. Toutefois, les files d’attente décentralisées sont souvent difficiles à observer, ce qui engendre des inefficacités et crée des possibilités d’accès informel par l’intermédiaire des réseaux de référence médicale. Cet article étudie une réforme mise en œuvre en 2016 au Québec, au Canada, qui a instauré un système centralisé d’attribution des demandes de consultation adressées par les médecins généralistes aux médecins spécialistes. Nous constatons que cette centralisation a entraîné une réduction statistiquement significative du nombre de nouvelles consultations auprès de médecins spécialistes. Nous reconstituons également les réseaux de référence entre médecins et estimons un modèle structurel qui nous permet de conclure que les médecins spécialistes ont tendance à reporter les consultations des patients orientés par des médecins généralistes dont ils reçoivent un nombre inhabituellement élevé de demandes de consultation.
Suggested Citation
Vincent Boucher & Josette Gbeto & Maripier Isabelle, 2026.
"Networks and Queues: Evidence from Medical Referrals in Canada,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2026s-27, CIRANO.
Handle:
RePEc:cir:cirwor:2026s-27
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More about this item
Keywords
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JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
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