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Dynamiques d'arbitrage entre écotaxe et permis d'émissions


  • Arnaud Dragicevic


This paper proposes three analyses of the tradeoff mechanism between ecotax and carbon credit. Our wish is to compare the ecotax level with the carbon credit price, subject to the minimization of the cost inherent to emissions. We redefine the calculus equations of the firm profit, in which we inject the parameters of energy intensity and emission intensity. We proceed to one static and two dynamic studies, whither we adapt the methodology of population dynamics. Our results highlight a simple tradeoff rule between ecotax and carbon credit, both in the static and dynamic models. In uncertainty, the rule determines whether the level of environmental tax is under- or overvalued compared to the carbon credit price. As well, the study enables to determine the global level of tax revenue attainable by the enforcement of the environmental taxation. Ce papier propose trois analyses sur le mécanisme d'arbitrage entre écotaxes et permis d'émissions. Notre souhait est de comparer le niveau de l'écotaxe avec le prix du permis d'émissions, sous contrainte de minimisation du coût inhérent aux émissions. Nous redéfinissons les équations de calcul du profit des entreprises où nous injectons les paramètres d'intensité énergétique et de facteur d'émissions. Nous procédons à une étude statique puis à deux études dynamiques dans lesquelles nous adaptons la méthodologie de la dynamique des populations. Nos résultats mettent en exergue une simple règle d'arbitrage entre écotaxe et permis d'émissions, aussi bien dans le modèle statique que les modèles dynamiques. Dans l'incertitude, la règle détermine si le niveau de la taxe environnementale est sous- ou surévalué par rapport au prix du permis d'émissions. L'étude permet également de déterminer le niveau global des recettes fiscales atteignable par la mise en vigueur de l'éco-fiscalité.

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  • Arnaud Dragicevic, 2011. "Dynamiques d'arbitrage entre écotaxe et permis d'émissions," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-45, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-45

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    More about this item


    diseconomic profit; environmental taxation; emissions trading; evolutionary game theory.; profit déséconomique; éco-fiscalité; bourse du carbone; théorie des jeux évolutionnaires.;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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