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Déterminants des heures travaillées au Québec et comparaisons avec l'Ontario


  • Benoit Dostie


In this article, we estimate the determinants of hours of work for Ontario and Quebec using Statistics Canada Labour Force Surveys. We first illustrate that intensity hours worked per employed person - has decreased in Quebec relative to Ontario between 1997 and 2005. We then proceed to show that differences in average observed characteristics between the two provinces explain at most 10 % of the difference. We next analyze in more details the impact of industry, occupation, public sector status and union status on the distribution of hours of work. We find that if the size and distribution of unions in Quebec were the same as in Ontario, the proportion of workers in Quebec working reduced hours would decrease significantly while the proportions working long or very long hours would increase. Nous étudions dans cet article les déterminants des heures travaillées par travailleur au Québec et en Ontario à l'aide des Enquêtes sur la population active (EPA) de Statistique Canada. Nous montrons tout d'abord que le différentiel dans l'intensité de la main d'oeuvre a augmenté en défaveur du Québec sur la période 1997-2005. Nous estimons ensuite que les différences dans les caractéristiques moyennes des deux provinces expliquent à peine 10 % du différentiel. Nous analysons finalement de façon plus détaillée l'impact de la structure industrielle, de la structure occupationnelle, de l'appartenance au secteur public et de l'appartenance à un syndicat sur la distribution de heures travaillées. Nous trouvons que ce dernier facteur est le plus important : l'imposition de la structure de syndicalisation ontarienne au Québec diminue de façon significative la proportion de travailleurs à temps réduit et augmente la proportion faisant de longues ou très longues heures.

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  • Benoit Dostie, 2008. "Déterminants des heures travaillées au Québec et comparaisons avec l'Ontario," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-21, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2008s-21

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    Ontario; Québec; hours of work; unions; Ontario; Québec; heures travaillées; syndicalisation;

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