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Le rendement privé et social de l'éducation universitaire au Québec : Estimations reposant sur le Recensement de 2006

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  • François Vaillancourt
  • Pouya Ebrahimi

Abstract

Selon les données du recensement de 2006, le rendement des études universitaires demeure élevé au Québec. Les taux de rendement privés sont plus élevés au baccalauréat et au doctorat qu'à la maîtrise. Le taux de rendement privé le plus élevé est atteint pour les études de médecine. Sauf pour le doctorat, les femmes ont généralement un taux de rendement privé des études universitaires plus élevé que celui des hommes toutes disciplines confondues. Les taux de rendement privés selon le sexe et le niveau d'étude sont également plus élevés que les taux de rendement sociaux correspondants. Les rendements présentés ici sont du même ordre que ceux obtenus dans d'autres études comme l'indique un examen des écrits pertinents.

Suggested Citation

  • François Vaillancourt & Pouya Ebrahimi, 2010. "Le rendement privé et social de l'éducation universitaire au Québec : Estimations reposant sur le Recensement de 2006," CIRANO Project Reports 2010rp-16, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirpro:2010rp-16
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    File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2010RP-16.pdf
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