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How personalized networks can limit free riding: A multi-group version of the public goods game

Author

Listed:
  • Aaron S. Berman

    (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

  • Laurence R. Iannaccone

    (Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics and Society, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

  • Mouli Modak

    (Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, Chapman University)

Abstract

People belong to many diferent groups, and few belong to the same network of groups. Moreover, people routinely reduce their involvement in dysfunctional groups while increasing involvement in those they fnd more attractive. The net efect can be an increase in overall cooperation and the partial isolation of free-riders, even if free-riders are never punished, excluded, or recognized. We formalize and test this conjecture with an agent-based social simulation and a multi-good extension of the standard repeated public goods game. Our initial results from three treatments suggest that the multi-group setting indeed raises overall cooperation and dampens the impact of freeriders. We extend our understanding of this setting by imposing greater heterogeneity between groups through interweaving automated bot players amongst human subjects; whereby initial sessions of this amplify the aforementioned efects.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron S. Berman & Laurence R. Iannaccone & Mouli Modak, 2023. "How personalized networks can limit free riding: A multi-group version of the public goods game," Working Papers 23-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-12
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/392/
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperation; public goods game; lab experiment; multi-group;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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