Finding All Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Static and Dynamic Games with Continuous Strategies
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- Che-Lin Su, 2014. "Estimating discrete-choice games of incomplete information: Simple static examples," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 167-207, June.
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KeywordsPolynomial equations; multiple equilibria; static games; dynamic games; Markov-perfect equilibria;
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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