A standard repurchase agreement between two counterparties is considered to examine the endogenous choice of collateral, the feasibility of secured lending, and welfare implications of the central bank’s collateral framework. As an innovation, we allow for two-sided counterparty risk. In line with empirical observations, it is shown that the most liquid and least risky assets are used as collateral in market transactions first. An endogenous opportunity cost arises from using liquid collateral with the central bank. Conditions are identified such that expected utility increases for all market participants when the central bank accepts a broader range
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|Date of creation:||Oct 2007|
|Date of revision:||Sep 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.SwissFinanceInstitute.ch|
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