IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/chf/rpseri/rp0821.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control

Author

Listed:
  • Rui Albuquerque

    (Boston University, CEPR and ECGI)

  • Enrique Schroth

    (University of Lausanne and Swiss Finance Institute)

Abstract

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi(2000) explicitly dealing with the existence of both block premia and block discounts in the data. We find evidence that the occurrence of block premia and block discounts depends on the controlling block holder’s ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target’s stock. Private benefits represent 3% of the target firm’s stock market value. Private benefits increase with the target’s cash holdings and decrease with its short term debt providing evidence in favor of Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis. A counterfactual policy evaluation of the Mandatory Bid Rule suggests that it fails to add value to shareholders because it fails to prevent welfare decreasing transactions and, by forcing inefficient tender offers, it deters welfare increasing transactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rui Albuquerque & Enrique Schroth, 2008. "The Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 08-21, Swiss Finance Institute, revised Oct 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0821
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1099901
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    block pricing; block trades; control transactions; private benefits of control; market rule; mandatory bid rule; structural estimation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp0821. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ridima Mittal (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fameech.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.