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Théorie de la décision: bilan et perspective

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  • Pierre Garello

    () (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

Abstract

Le titre de cette conférence est très ambitieux. Si je devais toutefois résumer le contenu de la conférence en quatre mots ce serait : bilan : positif, perspectives : incertaines. A dire vrai, la Théorie de la Décision est en crise, et ce depuis vingt bonnes années ; depuis que les doutes concernant le critère dominant de l’Utilité Espérée—doutes qui sont aussi anciens que le critère lui-même—ont refait surface. Mais il y a des crises salutaires ! Et il se pourrait bien que celle-ci en soit une. Je suis pour ma part plutôt optimiste. Evidemment, lorsque la Théorie de la Décision est en crise, c’est toute l’analyse économique qui souffre—et c’est pourquoi mon propos concerne je crois tout économiste, qu’il soit ou non spécialiste de la théorie de la décision. Lorsque la Théorie de la décision hésite, l’analyse économique se présente comme un colosse aux pieds d’argiles, tout du moins tant que l’analyse économique demeure fidèle à l’individualisme méthodologique. Aussi reviendrai-je en conclusion sur les conséquences de l’évolution de la théorie de la décision pour l’analyse économique en général ; mais pour la majeure partie de cette conférence je ferai abstraction de tout phénomène d’interaction pour me centrer sur l’action individuelle ainsi qu’il est de coutume en théorie de la décision…

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Garello, 2003. "Théorie de la décision: bilan et perspective," CAE Working Papers 02, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
  • Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:02
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    File Function: First version, 2003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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