IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cgd/wpaper/181.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Learning to Share: Explaining the Conditions under Which States Delegate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Aila M. Matanock

Abstract

A potential solution for weak or failing states is to enact a delegation agreement whereby a host relinquishes authority over some governance function to an external actor. Through case studies in Melanesia, I find that these arrangements can be implemented as treaties, rather than contracts, so that the external actor remains somewhat exempt from the normal procedure or law of the host state. I also generate hypotheses about the conditions under which host states and external actors enact these self-enforcing equilibria: host states request these agreements either where a major law and order problem leads to a loss of monopoly on the use of force, or where extortion or corruption leads to budgetary crisis. External actors agree to them only under the latter circumstances since this makes the reputational and actual costs of the mission lower, as judged against alternative methods for resolving the problem, and where that state also poses a specific transnational security threat.

Suggested Citation

  • Aila M. Matanock, 2009. "Learning to Share: Explaining the Conditions under Which States Delegate Governance," Working Papers 181, Center for Global Development.
  • Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:181
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422780
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julien Barbara, 2014. "From Intervention to Partnership—Prospects for Development Partnership in Solomon Islands after the RAMSI," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 395-408, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    weak states; fragile states; sovereignty; governance; Melanesia; external actors; delegation; intervention;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:181. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publications Manager). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cgdevus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.