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Post-Defense Returns: Dynamic Strategic States and the Value of Low-Return Actions

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  • Gerrit Meyerheim

Abstract

Observed action returns guide decisions: use less of the lower-return action. I show when that rule fails in adversarial environments. A zero-sum envelope validates comparisons. When actions move a persistent defense state, an interior stationary equilibrium equates the net current-return gap to the negative discounted value of the induced path. Observed and decision-relevant return gaps coincide when reallocation has no separate payoff effect. Otherwise, the observed gap must be adjusted. This creates a use-up/return-down inversion: strategic leverage can raise use while lowering the gross return gap. Stronger preparedness incentives and lower adjustment costs preserve this inversion with a forward-looking defender on an open set. A curvature-feedback condition characterizes their signs along an affine-equilibrium branch. A two-state patent model shows lower-return patents can remain privately valuable through diversion and blocking yet be socially overused. Net return gaps identify the continuation wedge, not its decomposition into state values, persistence, and action leverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerrit Meyerheim, 2026. "Post-Defense Returns: Dynamic Strategic States and the Value of Low-Return Actions," CESifo Working Paper Series 12962, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12962
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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