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The Quiet Payoff: Mafia Electoral Support and Policy Inaction

Author

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  • Alessio Carrozzo Magli
  • Giovanni Righetto
  • Antonio Schiavone

Abstract

Organised crime groups often deliver electoral support to politicians, yet how they are rewarded remains unclear. Using data from Sicilian municipalities (1992–2022), we show that narrowly won races by Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, coincide with sharp declines in the reallocation of confiscated mafia assets—but only in mafia-controlled areas. Exploiting historical variation in the mafia’s vote-buying capacity, we find that municipalities with stronger historical ties experience larger post-election declines, exclusively under Berlusconi’s governments. Instrumenting modern support with this proxy further reinforces the plausibly causal evidence that national authorities reward organised crime through policy inaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessio Carrozzo Magli & Giovanni Righetto & Antonio Schiavone, 2025. "The Quiet Payoff: Mafia Electoral Support and Policy Inaction," CESifo Working Paper Series 12330, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12330
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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