Maastricht e o Gerenciamento da União Monetária Europeia
This article shows that, to a large extent, the European sovereign debt crisis resulted from the institutional arrangement of Maastricht, as well as the policies pursued by the European leadership, formatted from the "new macroeconomic consensus" and the theory of optimal economic area. In particular, it argues that, largely, the crisis and its deepening resulted from the fact that the European Central Bank did not play the role of lender of last resort, as well as the implementation of policies and adjustment focused on cutting public spending and increasing taxation.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2013|
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