The Politics and Economics of Parking on Campus
Universities have tried almost every possible way to deal with the shortage of campus parking: lotteries, hunting licenses, first-come-first-served, waiting lists, seniority, and need-based systems. As another way to eliminate parking shortages, this paper proposes using the Goldilocks Principle of parking prices to balance supply and demand: the price at any location is too high if many spaces are vacant, and too low if no spaces are vacant. When a few vacant spaces are available everywhere, the prices are just right and drivers can always find a place to park. The chapter concludes by proposing a pilot program to test driversâ€™ responses to performance prices for campus parking.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2011|
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