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Getting Permission When Options Are Partially Ordered

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  • Hu, Peicong
  • Sobel, Joel

Abstract

A manager has access to expert advisers. The manager selects at most one project and can implement it only if one expert provides support. The game in which the manager consults experts simultaneously typically has multiple equilibria including one in which at least one expert supports the manager’s favorite project. We describe the set of outcomes that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. These outcomes typically exclude the manager’s most preferred equilibrium outcome. We introduce sequential procedures and compare their performance to the simultaneous game. In general, sequential consultation may be superior or inferior to simultaneous consultation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Peicong & Sobel, Joel, 2025. "Getting Permission When Options Are Partially Ordered," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3q79f8sh, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt3q79f8sh
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