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The Organization Of Family Interactions: Minimizing Transaction Costs And Strategic Behavior

  • Wittman, Donald

The optimal organization of the family requires that relations are structured so that non-cooperative game playing is minimized and transaction costs are reduced. I show that therapeutic advice for behavior within the family is to create a functioning property rights system. Punishment is shown to be inferior to setting limits because the first encourages strategic game playing. I show why there is conflict between parent and their child even when the parent maximizes the child’s expected discounted utility. In addition, I provide a model of the intergenerational transfer of behavior.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt9xg179zp.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt9xg179zp
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