A Demand-Side Theory of Antitakeover Defenses
This article develops a demand-and-supply framework to analyze the adoption of antitakeover defenses and constructs a demand-side theory of antitakeover provisions ("ATP's"). The article views the decision to go public without ATP's as a decision to produce an unshielded target and shows that the classic literature focused on the costs of producing such a target but barely accounted for demand-side considerations. The article argues that the more firms there are producing unsheilded targets (and, therefore, the fewer firms adopting ATP's), the lower the price the market is willing to pay for the unshielded product. The reason for this is that not only do ATP's prevent takeovers, they also divert takeover activity to unshielded targets. The combination of existing supply-side explanations with the novel demand-side theory works to explain the findings of recent empirical studies of ATP's at IPO stage firms that have puzzled the corporate finance and corporate law literature.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2003|
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