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Market Structure, Organizational Structure, and R&D Diversity

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  • Farrell, Joseph
  • Gilbert, Richard J.
  • Katz, Michael L.

Abstract

We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms on equilibrium R&D projects. We compare a monopolist’s choice of R&D portfolio to that of a welfare maximizer. We next show that Sah and Stiglitz’s finding that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the number of firms under Bertrand competition extends to neither Cournot oligopoly nor a cartel. We also show that the ability of firms to pre-empt R&D by rivals along particular research paths can lead to socially excessive R&D diversification. Lastly, using Sah and Stiglitz’s definition of hierarchy, we establish conditions under which larger hierarchies invest in smaller portfolios.
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Suggested Citation

  • Farrell, Joseph & Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2002. "Market Structure, Organizational Structure, and R&D Diversity," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2pn5t5nj, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt2pn5t5nj
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anton, James J & Yao, Dennis A, 1994. "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 190-209, March.
    2. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Human Fallibility and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 292-297, May.
    3. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1987. "R&D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 402-420, June.
    4. Rebecca Henderson, 1993. "Underinvestment and Incompetence as Responses to Radical Innovation: Evidence from the Photolithographic Alignment Equipment Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(2), pages 248-270, Summer.
    5. Ross, Stephen A, 1981. "Some Stronger Measures of Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large with Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 621-638, May.
    6. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    8. Michael L. Katz, 1980. "Multiplant Monopoly in a Spatial Market," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 519-535, Autumn.
    9. Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1989. "The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 849-908, Elsevier.
    10. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-526, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert Richard J, 2006. "Competition and Innovation," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Athanasopoulos, Thanos, 2014. "Incentives to Innovate, Compatibility and Efficiency in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1054, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Stefano Comino & Fabio M. Manenti, 2022. "Patent portfolios and firms’ technological choices," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 137(2), pages 97-120, October.
    4. Athanasopoulos, Thanos, 2015. "Incentives to Innovate, Compatibility and Welfare in Durable Goods Markets with Network Effects," Economic Research Papers 270229, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    5. Francesco Laforgia & Fabio Montobbio & Luigi Orsenigo, 2007. "IPRs, technological and industrial development and growth: the case of the pharmaceutical industry," KITeS Working Papers 206, KITeS, Centre for Knowledge, Internationalization and Technology Studies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Oct 2007.
    6. Alexei Alexandrov, 2015. "When Should Firms Expose Themselves to Risk?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(12), pages 3001-3008, December.
    7. Richard J. Gilbert, 2019. "Competition, Mergers, and R&D Diversity," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(3), pages 465-484, May.
    8. Richard Gilbert, 2006. "Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 6, pages 159-215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    internal organization; market power; research and development; Business; Social and Behavioral Sciences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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