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Competition Law Enforcement: the "Free-Riding" Plaintiff and Incentives for the Revelation of Private Information

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Harker

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

  • Morten Hviid

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

The past and current reluctance of firms and individuals to use private enforcement suggests that there are limited incentives for self-help. The key contribution of private enforcement to overall deterrence derives from cases which would not otherwise be brought, not simply because of resource constraints, but also because relevant information would not otherwise have come to light. In terms of revealing such private information, cases initiated and pursued by private litigants add much more to the equation that do cases merely following on from decisions made by competition authorities. In this paper we use a simple model to highlight what features of the private enforcement system promote and hamper the use of these two different types of private enforcement. A key finding is that to encourage new cases, it is essential that private enforcement is quicker than the time it takes to get a decision in a follow-on case.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Harker & Morten Hviid, 2006. "Competition Law Enforcement: the "Free-Riding" Plaintiff and Incentives for the Revelation of Private Information," Working Papers 06-9, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
    • Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp06-09
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    File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP06-9.pdf
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    Keywords

    Private enforcement; litigation; deterrence; competition law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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