IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bru/bruppp/04-07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial Contracts and Strategic customer Exclusion

Author

Listed:
  • Naoki KOJIMA

    ()

Abstract

The paper studies an incentive contract in a monopolistic and duopolistic credit market where borrowers are di erent in risk. One lender is in an advantaged position with respect to the other due to past relations with the borrowers. The features of the equilibrium contract are investigated. It is shown that the equilibrium contract drastically changes between the monopolistic and the duopolistic situations and are sensitive to other parameters. In some cases, the superior lender strategically yields borrowers, especially the better ones to the opponent lender.

Suggested Citation

  • Naoki KOJIMA, 2004. "Financial Contracts and Strategic customer Exclusion," Public Policy Discussion Papers 04-07, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
  • Handle: RePEc:bru:bruppp:04-07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/329/efwps/04-07.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bru:bruppp:04-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John.Hunter). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.