Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis
Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a fixed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK|
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