Production extended research joint ventures and welfare
A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the .nal market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.
|Date of creation:||2008|
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