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Relevant Decision Problems and Value of Information


  • Lily Ling Yang



In this paper, we employ a novel approach to study the value of information in games. A decision problem is relevant to another if the optimal decision rule of the former, when applied to the latter, is better than making a decision without any information in the latter. In a game, if the problem originally faced by a player is relevant to the problem induced by a change of the situation, the player benefits more from her own information after the change. Using the notion of relevance, we study the value of information in various games, even when a closed form solution is not available.

Suggested Citation

  • Lily Ling Yang, 2018. "Relevant Decision Problems and Value of Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_025, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_025

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    Value of information; Quadratic game; Global game; Persuasion game;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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