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A simple mechanism for the roommate problem

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  • B. Evci

Abstract

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed that there is a similar game to the marriage problem called "the roommate problem". And, they showed that unlike the marriage problem, the roommate problem may have unstable solutions. In other words, the stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the roommate problem. The mechanism is successful in determining the reason of instability in our game scenario. And, we show that our mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the instance of instability.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Evci, 2014. "A simple mechanism for the roommate problem," Working Papers wp975, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp975
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    1. B. Evci, 2014. "A new dynamic mechanism to the marriage problem with a variant," Working Papers wp973, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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      JEL classification:

      • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
      • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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