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R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot

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  • F. Delbono
  • V. Denicolo

Abstract

Since the work of Schumpeter, it has been argued that there may exist a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper we compare the R&D performance of CCournot and Bertrand oligopolists. We model a one-shot noncooperative game in which firms invest in R&D, with the aim of being first in a competition for a patentable cost-reducing innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • F. Delbono & V. Denicolo, 1988. "R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot," Working Papers 48, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:48
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