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The Transformation of Labour Managed Monopoly: Competition Policy Versus Mixed Firms

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  • G. Rossini
  • C. Scarpa

Abstract

Starting from a market monopolized by a two plant labour-managed (LM) firm, we consider alternative ways to reduce the inefficiencies associated with this market arrangement. The first possibility is the creation of a duopoly, in which a plant is turned into a LM firm, while the other one is either LM, or is managed to maximize profits. The second one is the negotiated creation of a "mixed firm", managed by workers and Government representatives. Its objective function reflects the different goals of its participants. Welfare comparisons purport the mixed duopoly as the preferable solution.

Suggested Citation

  • G. Rossini & C. Scarpa, 1991. "The Transformation of Labour Managed Monopoly: Competition Policy Versus Mixed Firms," Working Papers 102, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:102
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    Cited by:

    1. MARINI, Marco, 1996. "Property Rights and Market : Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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