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Alternative Signalling Equilibrium Concepts

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  • John G. Riley

    (University of California-Los Angeles)

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  • John G. Riley, 1978. "Alternative Signalling Equilibrium Concepts," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 87, Boston College Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:87
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    2. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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