IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocoec/1098.html

Coalitional Stability in a Class of Social Interactions Games

Author

Listed:
  • Hideo Konishi

    (Boston College)

  • Michel Le Breton

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

  • Shlomo Weber

    (Southern Methodist University)

Abstract

In this paper, we define additive dyadic social interactions games (ADG), in which each player cares not only about the selected action, but also about interactions with other players, especially those who choose the same action. This class of games includes alliance formation games, network games, and dis- crete choice problems with network externalities. While it is known that games in the ADG class admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is a maximizer of the game's potential, the potential approach does not always apply if all coalitional deviations are allowed. We then introduce a novel notion of a strong landscape equilibrium, which relies on a limited scope of coalitional deviations. We show the existence of a strong landscape equilibrium for a class of basic additive dyadic social interactions games (BADG), even though a strong Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Somewhat surprisingly, a potential-maximizing strong landscape equilibrium is not always a strong Nash equilibrium even if the set of the latter is nonempty. We also provide applications and extensions of our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Hideo Konishi & Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, 2025. "Coalitional Stability in a Class of Social Interactions Games," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1098, Boston College Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:1098
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp1098.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence E. Blume & William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf & Rajshri Jayaraman, 2015. "Linear Social Interactions Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(2), pages 444-496.
    2. repec:dgr:rugccs:200401 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Charles F. Manski, 2000. "Economic Analysis of Social Interactions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136, Summer.
    4. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
    5. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    6. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    7. Peter Kooreman & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2007. "A discrete-choice model with social interactions: with an application to high school teen behavior," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 599-624.
    8. Russett, Bruce M., 1966. "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 327-339, June.
    9. Axelrod, Robert & Bennett, D. Scott, 1993. "A Landscape Theory of Aggregation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 211-233, April.
    10. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "Clubs with Entrapment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1824-1829, December.
    11. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    12. Tabuchi, Takatoshi, 1986. "Urban agglomeration economies in a Linear City," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 421-436, August.
    13. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
    14. HervÊ Moulin, 1999. "Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(2), pages 279-320.
    15. Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2009. "Existence of Pure Strategies Nash Equilibria in Social Interaction Games with Dyadic Externalities," CEPR Discussion Papers 7279, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Le Breton, Michel & Shapoval, Alexander & Weber, Shlomo, 2021. "A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 41-46.
    3. Krzysztof R. Apt & Bart Keijzer & Mona Rahn & Guido Schäfer & Sunil Simon, 2017. "Coordination games on graphs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 851-877, August.
    4. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2023. "Fair congested assignment problem," Papers 2301.12163, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    5. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    6. Steven N. Durlauf & Yannis M. Ioannides, 2010. "Social Interactions," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 451-478, September.
    7. Fang Li & Hongxu Ma & Suyan Shen, 2024. "Volunteering in China: How significant is the peer effect?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(3), pages 1848-1865, April.
    8. Mirta B. Gordon & Jean-Pierre Nadal & Denis Phan & Viktoriya Semeshenko, 2012. "Entanglement between Demand and Supply in Markets with Bandwagon Goods," Papers 1209.1321, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2012.
    9. Yann Bramoullé & Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin, 2020. "Peer Effects in Networks: A Survey," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 603-629, August.
    10. Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2022. "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 61-76, March.
    11. Sommarat Chantarat & Christopher Barrett, 2012. "Social network capital, economic mobility and poverty traps," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 10(3), pages 299-342, September.
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13781 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Nicole Schneeweis & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2008. "Peer effects in Austrian schools," Studies in Empirical Economics, in: Christian Dustmann & Bernd Fitzenberger & Stephen Machin (ed.), The Economics of Education and Training, pages 133-155, Springer.
    14. Gibbons, Steve & Overman, Henry G. & Patacchini, Eleonora, 2015. "Spatial Methods," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 115-168, Elsevier.
    15. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, "undated". "Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination," Economic Research Papers 269414, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    16. Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023. "Equilibria in bottleneck games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 649-685, September.
    17. Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 315-330, August.
    18. Blume,L.E. & Durlauf,S.N., 2005. "Identifying social interactions : a review," Working papers 12, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    19. Ana Balsa & Carlos D az, 2018. "Social interactions in health behaviors and conditions," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1802, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    20. Milchtaich, Igal, 2009. "Weighted congestion games with separable preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 750-757, November.
    21. Roméo Fontaine & Agnès Gramain & Jérôme Wittwer, 2009. "Providing care for an elderly parent: interactions among siblings?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(9), pages 1011-1029, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:1098. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/debocus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.