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Comparative Statics of Altruism and Spite

Author

Listed:
  • Igal Milchtaich

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

The equilibrium outcome of a symmetric interaction between two people may depend on the weight r they place on each other’s payoff. A positive, zero, or negative weight represents altruism, egoism, or spite, respectively. Paradoxically, the individual payoff in a symmetric equilibrium for a pair of altruists may be lower than for egoists or spiteful individuals. However, this can only occur if the equilibrium strategies are unstable. If they are stable, the individual payoff can only increase with increasing r or remain unchanged.

Suggested Citation

  • Igal Milchtaich, 2004. "Comparative Statics of Altruism and Spite," Working Papers 2004-07, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2004-07
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Altruism; symmetric games; comparative statics; stability of equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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