IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bge/wpaper/997.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Debt Dilution and Debt Overhang

Author

Listed:
  • Joachim Jungherr
  • Immo Schott

Abstract

We introduce risky long-term debt (and a maturity choice) to a dynamic model of firm financing and production. This allows us to study two distortions which are absent from standard models of short-term debt: (1.) Debt dilution distorts firms’ choice of debt which has an indirect effect on investment; (2.) Debt overhang directly distorts investment. In a dynamic model of production, leverage, and debt maturity, we show that the two distortions interact to reduce investment, increase leverage, and increase the default rate. We provide empirical evidence from U.S. firms that is consistent with the model predictions. Debt dilution and debt overhang can overturn standard results: A financial reform which increases investment, employment, output, and welfare in a standard model of short-term debt can have the opposite effect in a model with short-term debt and long-term debt.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Jungherr & Immo Schott, 2017. "Debt Dilution and Debt Overhang," Working Papers 997, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/997_0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joachim Jungherr & Immo Schott, 2018. "The Long-term Debt Accelerator," 2018 Meeting Papers 961, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Reiter, Michael & Zessner-Spitzenberg, Leopold, 2023. "Long-term bank lending and the transfer of aggregate risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    investment; debt dilution; Debt Overhang;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:997. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bruno Guallar (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bargses.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.