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Crowdfunding with Sequential Moves and Costly Common Value Signals

Author

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  • Matthew Ellman
  • Sjaak Hurkens

Abstract

Cong and Xiao (2024) show that All-or-Nothing crowdfunding, modelled as a sequential game with observational learning and free private information, achieves efficiency and extracts all surplus in the asymptotic limit as the crowd size grows. Ellman and Hurkens (2025a) model investment-based crowdfunding as a simultaneous move game with costly information acquisition. They establish a single upper bound on per capita welfare and profit in symmetric equilibria that is shown to be tight in asymptotically large crowds. This paper shows that with costly information, sequentiality allows for strictly higher welfare but not for higher profit.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2026. "Crowdfunding with Sequential Moves and Costly Common Value Signals," Working Papers 1548, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1548
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    Cited by:

    1. Ilzetzki, Ethan, 2025. "Guns and growth: The economic consequences of defense buildups," Kiel Reports 2, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Mai Chi Dao & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Daniel Leigh & Prachi Mishra, 2024. "Understanding the International Rise and Fall of Inflation since 2020," NBER Chapters, in: Inflation in the COVID Era and Beyond, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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