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Credit Rationing and Asset Value

Author

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  • Antonio Affuso

    (University of Milan)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of real assets as collateral on the economy. I construct a model that shows how credit rationing is mitigated by the existence of bad firms whether it is linked to the value of distressed assets. Indeed, when loans are collateralized and firms are credit constrained, the amount borrowed is determined by the value of the collateral. The model builds on Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) to show that there exists a link between firms' debt capacities and asset values in case of distress and the classical credit rationing model. Such as in the paper of Shleifer and Vishny, I endogenize the assets price. The price depends on whether there are firms that repurchase the assets. In fact, it depends on the number of bad firms in the economy as well as on the liquidity of good firms. In the model is possible to have a separating equilibrium only if there exists a number of bad firms that go bankrupt and if there exist good firms with sufficient liquidity. Each firm derives positive externalities from the existence of other firms. Indeed, the optimal leverage of firms depends on the possibility of repurchasing the assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Affuso, 2007. "Credit Rationing and Asset Value," UNIMI - Research Papers in Economics, Business, and Statistics unimi-1065, Universitá degli Studi di Milano.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:unimip:unimi-1065
    Note: oai:cdlib1:unimi-1065
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Affuso, 2007. "Credit rationing and real assets: evidence from Italian panel data," Economics Department Working Papers 2007-EP09, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    2. Alin Marius Andrieș & Nicu Marcu & Florin Oprea & Mihaela Tofan, 2018. "Financial Infrastructure and Access to Finance for European SMEs," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-15, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; credit rationing; real assets; asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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