IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bep/itfapp/1084.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Case of Arab Countries and the World Trade Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Bashar Malkawi

    (Hashemite University (Jordan))

Abstract

Arab countries are attempting to broaden their engagement in the multilateral trading system in a manner that has many implications. Not only have some Arab countries either acceded or are in the pipeline of acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but their new commitments coincides with reorientations in their economic strategies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the involvement and implications of the multilateral trading system on Arab countries. The proposition in this paper is that the WTO is not a perfect institution. In WTO accession, politics matter more than commerce or trade. I argue that the Arab region is still marginalized and the international community must assist Arab countries in integrating into the multilateral trading system. This paper was presented at the 16th International Conference of the International Trade and Finance Association in Lodz, Poland, May 11, 2006.

Suggested Citation

  • Bashar Malkawi, 2006. "The Case of Arab Countries and the World Trade Organization," International Trade and Finance Association Conference Papers 1084, International Trade and Finance Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:itfapp:1084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 833-850.
    3. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    4. Feenstra, Robert C., 1989. "Symmetric pass-through of tariffs and exchange rates under imperfect competition: An empirical test," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 25-45.
    5. Cadot, Olivier & de Melo, Jaime & Olarraga, Marcelo, 1999. "Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs against Nonmembers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(3), pages 635-657, August.
    6. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter, 1997. "Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 1243-1272.
    7. Finger, J. Michael & Reincke, Ulrich & Castro, Adriana, 1999. "Market access bargaining in the Uruguay Round - Rigid or relaxed reciprocity?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2258, The World Bank.
    8. Matthias Busse, 2000. "The hub and spoke approach of EU trade policy," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 35(4), pages 153-154, July.
    9. Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "On Tariff Preferences And Delegation Decisions In Customs Unions: A Heckscher--Ohlin Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 625-648, July.
    10. John Romalis, 2007. "NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 416-435, August.
    11. John H. Jackson, 1997. "The World Trading System, 2nd Edition: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262600277, January.
    12. Won Chang & L. Alan Winters, 2002. "How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of MERCOSUR," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 889-904.
    13. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2011. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1238-1273, June.
    14. Bohara, Alok K. & Gawande, Kishore & Sanguinetti, Pablo, 2004. "Trade diversion and declining tariffs: evidence from Mercosur," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 65-88.
    15. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-519, September.
    16. Nuno Limão & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2006. "Trade Preferences to Small Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 20(2), pages 217-240.
    17. Riedel, James, 1977. "Tariff concessions in the Kennedy Round and the structure of protection in West Germany : An econometric assessment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 133-143.
    18. Nuno Limão, 2007. "Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 821-855.
    19. Karacaovali, Baybars & Limão, Nuno, 2008. "The clash of liberalizations: Preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalization in the European Union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 299-327.
    20. Finger, J M, 1976. "Effects of the Kennedy Round Tariff Concessions on the Exports of Developing Countries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 86(341), pages 87-95, March.
    21. Paul Krugman, 1989. "Is Bilateralism Bad?," NBER Working Papers 2972, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Lim“o, Nuno, 2002. "Are Preferential trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 129, Royal Economic Society.
    23. Foroutan, Faezeh, 1998. "Does membership in a regional preferential trade arrangement make a country more or less protectionist?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1898, The World Bank.
    24. Finger, J M, 1974. "GATT Tariff Concessions and the Exports of Developing Countries-United States Concessions at the Dillon Round," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 84(335), pages 566-575, September.
    25. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    26. Feenstra, Robert C., 1989. "Symmetric pass-through of tariffs and exchange rates under imperfect competition: An empirical test," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 25-45.
    27. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1998. "Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the Multilateral Trading System?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1162-1182, July.
    28. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 411-437.
    29. Olarreaga, Marcelo & Soloaga, Isidro & Winters, Alan, 1999. "What's behind MERCOSUR's common external tariff?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2231, The World Bank.
    30. Constantopoulos, Maria, 1974. "Labour protection in Western Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 313-328, December.
    31. Faezeh Foroutan, 1998. "Does Membership in a Regional Preferential Trade Arrangement Make a Country More or Less Protectionist?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 305-335, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bep:itfapp:1084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/itfaeea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.