IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Analysis of Optimal Bids in the Primary Auction of Mexican Federal Government Bonds: Results of a Structural Econometric Modeling Approach


  • Sara Gabriela Castellanos Pascacio
  • Marco Oviedo


In this article we analyze the treasury securities primary auctions of the Mexican Federal Government, using a structural econometric model of Février, Préget and Visser (2002). This model allows to make revenue comparisons across auction formats. Our analysis shows the revenue superiority of the uniform auction format over the discriminatory one. Comparisons with previous estimations as well as simulation exercises of the securities’ value signals, suggest that this result may be explained by the winner’s curse.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Gabriela Castellanos Pascacio & Marco Oviedo, 2004. "Analysis of Optimal Bids in the Primary Auction of Mexican Federal Government Bonds: Results of a Structural Econometric Modeling Approach," Working Papers 2004-07, Banco de México.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2004-07

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    auctions; treasury securities; winner’s curse; structural econometric models;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2004-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dirección de Sistemas). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.