Analysis of Optimal Bids in the Primary Auction of Mexican Federal Government Bonds: Results of a Structural Econometric Modeling Approach
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Keywordsauctions; treasury securities; winner’s curse; structural econometric models;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
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